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PREVENTING VIOLENCE AGAINST GAY MEN AND
LESBIANS: SHOULD ENHANCED PENALTIES AT
SENTENCING EXTEND TO BIAS CRIMES




Smithton, Pennsylvania, population 300, is a small town in
western Pennsylvania where everyone knows everyone and every-
thing about everyone. Like many small towns Smithton consid-
ers itself a closely knit community where common knowledge
about each member encourages understanding and tolerance.
The brutal killing of native son Paul Edward Steckman, however,
shattered the assumptions Smithton residents had about commu-
nity tolerance.' On March 27, 1994, the forty-six year old
Steckman was beaten almost beyond recognition and left to die
on the street.2 He was one block from his mother's house, to
which he had returned from New York City two years earlier to
care for his ailing mother.3 The brutal violence of this murder
explains part of Smithton's shock; but more shocking still was
accused killer seventeen year old Samuel Louis Sethman's asser-
tion that the murderous beating was motivated by Steckman's
homosexual advance towards him.4
Attitudes in the community toward Steckman's homosexual-
ity had been mixed; a number of older citizens denied
Steckman's homosexuality, even though Smithton's younger gen-
eration stated that he had been a known and obvious gay man.5
When his "differences" had become obvious, when Steckman
flirted with other men at local bars, when he did not hide his
sexual preference, community response varied. For some, he was
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still a friend with a great sense of humor; others considered him
a "fag" and talked about his needing a beating.
6
Those attitudes about homosexuality colored perceptions
about Steckman's killing. Some townspeople rationalized the
murder as an extreme reaction to homosexual advances or as a
result of aggression against gays being considered "manly" by
teens.7  But while some townspeople may have thought
Steckman's sexual openness had gone too far for Smithton, all
agreed that Sethman's response went too far for any community,
especially their own.'
Smithton's experience exemplifies a large scale reexamina-
tion of attitudes about sexual orientation and violent crime. As
violence motivated by bias against sexual orientation becomes
more pronounced in American society, communities must
respond by both punishing the crime itself and reducing the
intolerant attitudes towards gay victims that cause the crime.
One solution already used to respond to bias motivated violence
involves enhanced penalties at sentencing for crimes motivated
by bias against homosexuals. Traditional prejudices against
homosexuality, however, often block the extension of statutory
protection to bias based on sexual orientation; many states
exclude sexual orientation in their hate crime statutes9 or pro-
scribe bias conduct so broadly that sexual orientation is not men-
tioned directly."l
This Article argues that bias crimes" l based on actual or per-
ceived sexual orientation require enhanced penalties at sentenc-




9. See COLO. RFv. STAT. § 18-9-121 (West 1990); IDAHO CODE § 18-7902
(1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 470A (Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
265, § 39 (Law Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.147b (West 1991);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 574.090-.093 (Vernon Supp. 1994); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-
5-221, -222 (1993); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.30 (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 14-3, 14-401.14 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-14-04, -05 (1985);
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 850 (West Supp. 1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2710 (1983); RI. GEN.
LAws § 11-42-3 (1994); S.D. COD. LAws ANN. § 22-1915-1 (Supp. 1994); W. VA.
CODE § 61-6-21 (1992).
10. See IowA CODE ANN. § 729.5 (West 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17
§§ 2931-2932 (West Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 37 (Law Co-
op. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-05 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-309
(1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.47 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-3-203.3 (Supp. 1994).
11. Throughout this Article I will use the terms "bias crime" and "hate
crime" interchangeably to refer to criminal acts in which the perpetrator
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protection under state and federal laws when they are victims of
these crimes. Bias crimes by their nature create divisive social
repercussions within the victim's group and the community at
large; criminal acts committed against gays because of their sex-
ual orientation reinforces intolerance of diversity. This Article
therefore begins by examining anti-gay violence in the United
States. Part I shows that the seriousness of these crimes is magni-
fied by the vulnerable legal and social status of homosexual vic-
tims. These constraints marginalize gay men and lesbians in the
American criminal justice system, giving homosexual victims a
lesser standard of protection against violent crime than hetero-
sexual victims.
States have recognized and addressed gay victims' marginal-
ization by enacting statutes that enhance sentences for bias moti-
vated crimes.1 2 Part II addresses the constitutional questions
raised by these types of statutes by examining the Supreme
Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell."3 Part III argues that if
bias crimes against gay men and lesbians are a significant social
problem, and statutes allowing for increased penalties for bias
crimes are constitutional, bias crimes statutes should explicitly
include sexual orientation as a category to be protected under
these statutes. Without a specific assignment of criminal liability
for intentionally selecting gay men and lesbians as victims, Ameri-
can criminal codes will not adequately protect homosexual vic-
tims, thereby allowing these victims' fundamental right to
protection of person and property to be infringed. As enhanced
sentencing statutes address the defendant's bias against the vic-
tim's status as a homosexual, these statutes would neither
infringe upon states' rights to regulate homosexual behavior nor
conflict with the moral teachings of the majority of religious
organizations in the United States. Furthermore, by enhancing
the punishment for gay bashing crimes, these laws would send a
clear message that this type of bias violence will not be tolerated
by our society.
intentionally selected the victim because of the victim's actual or perceived
sexual orientation.
12. This Article will not discuss the particular characteristics of the types
of bias crime penalty enhancement statutes in effect today. For an overview of
some of the specific provisions of these statutes, see. Marguerite Angelari, Hate
Crime Statutes: A Promising Tool for Fighting Violence Against Women, 2 Am. U. J.
GENDER & L. 63, 67-70 (1994); Thomas D. Brooks, First Amendment-Penalty
Enhancement for Hate Crimes: Content Regulation, Questionable State Interests and
Non-Traditional Sentencing, 84 J. CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 703, 705-08
(1994) (student article).
13. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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I. VIOLENCE AGAINST GAY MEN AND LESBIANS
All bias crimes are violent crimes in which "the defendant's
conduct was motivated by hatred, bias, or prejudice, based on the
actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnic-
ity, gender, or sexual orientation of another individual or group
of individuals." 4 In general terms, a bias crime occurs when a
defendant intentionally selects a victim as a result of the defend-
ant's bias against the victim's actual or perceived identification
with one of the. protected groups. Bias is not an element of the
underlying criminal offense itself.
To understand the reach of bias crime statutes, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that it is the defendant's act of intentionally
selecting the victim because of the defendant's bias that brings
criminal liability. These statutes do not reach biased statements
by the defendant that occurred outside of the context of an
actual crime or are incidental to the commission of the crime.
The defendant must select the victim and commit the crime
because the defendant is biased against the victim. For example,
in a random fight among passers-by in a non-gay neighborhood,
if one person shouts anti-gay slurs, and one person happens to be
gay, this does not necessarily violate a bias crime statute. A man
who intentionally waits outside a gay club and assaults and robs a
patron as she leaves, however, would clearly be committing a bias
crime.
Bias crimes are a recognized problem in the United States,
as statistical evidence tracks "[h] ate crime... [as] a geographically
widespread, persistent pattern of criminal behavior of significant
proportions."15 These crimes cause repercussions which affect
all of society. Bias crimes exacerbate social divisions within com-
munities, leading to tension and even widespread violence, like
the nationwide rioting that occurred after the first verdict in
favor of the police officers in the Rodney King beating trial. 6
Bias crimes, therefore, not only perpetuate prejudice, they bring
widespread social tension and possible physical destruction to
communities.
14. Leading Cases, Penalty Enhancement for Bias-Motivated Crimes, 107
HARv. L. REv. 234, 234 n.1 (1993) [hereinafter Penalty Enhancement] (quoting
H.R. 4797, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)).
15. Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 29
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 387, 407 (1994).
16. David Deitchman, Comment, Limits on the Right to Hate: A Look at the
Texas Hate Crime Act, 46 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 399, 416 (1994). See also Sally Ann
Stewart & Haya El Nasser, Tensions Explode in L.A., USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 1992, at
3A (describing the rioting in Los Angeles after the April 29, 1992 acquittal of
four white L.A. police officers in the beating of Rodney King, a black man).
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All bias crimes damage communities because not only are
individual persons victimized by the actual crime, but bias crimes
inflict "unique psychic harm" on their victims17 as a result of
their being intentionally selected because of appearance or sta-
tus. Anti-gay violence, therefore, is similar in effect to racial or
ethnic violence because both serve "to perpetuate prejudice and
victimize an entire class of persons."18 Crimes against one indi-
vidual because of that person's perceived status undermine confi-
dence in the personal security of all who share that same status.19
Hate crimes against individual gay men and lesbians have a
wider impact on the gay community. "In these types of assaults
[heterosexuals attacking gays and lesbians], it is plausible to claim
that the systematic victimization of one group by another leaves
the members of the victimized group extraordinarily vulnerable
and insecure." ° Even if gay men and lesbians are not the direct
victims of anti-gay violence, they share its effects.
[M]any men and women in the gay and lesbian communi-
ties have escaped direct physical attack by perpetrators of
homophobic violence. However, the horror and sinister
efficacy of homophobic violence are in many ways like
those of racist violence. Like people of color, gay men and
lesbians always and everywhere have to live their lives on
guard, knowing that they are vulnerable to attack at any
time. Indeed, much of the efficacy of homophobic vio-
lence lies in the message it conveys to those who are not its
immediate victims.
2 1
If anti-gay crimes are considered criminal acts only because of
their violence, the community fails to respond to this message.
Bias elements in these crimes show society's intolerance of gay
17. Note, Hate is not Speech: A Constitutional Defense of Penalty Enhancement
for Hate Crimes, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1314, 1314 & n.2 (1993) [hereinafter
Constitutional Defense].
18. Note, Developments in the Law - Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1508, 1541 (1989) [hereinafter Sexual Orientation].
19. See MARSHALL KIRK AND HUNTER MADSEN, AFTER THE BALL: How
AMERICA WILL CONQUER ITS FEAR AND HATRED OF GAYS IN THE 90s 105-06
(1989). In describing the effects of violence against gay men and lesbians, the
authors state that this violence "robs them of the sense of security that every
citizen should have. It dampens or breaks their natural confidence, their social
ease .... [Glays . . . are constantly conscious of their stigma, and learn to
circumvent abuse in public with an ever-present wariness." Id.
20. James B. Jacobs, Hate Crime Legislation: Challenging Intolerance, REPORT
FROM THE INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY, Spring/Summer 1992,
reprinted in CURRENT, Sept. 1992, at 18.
21. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431,
1464 (1992).
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men and lesbians and exacerbate the oppression of homosexuals
as a group.
Though violence against gays is an ongoing phenomenon,
the increased visibility of gay rights issues has focused attention
on anti-gay crimes. Debate over these issues brought attitudes
about gays out in the open and may have increased both inci-
dents and reports of anti-gay bias crimes. In 1992, when Colo-
rado's voters passed Amendment 2, an anti-gay rights initiative,22
numerous reports of bias crimes based on sexual orientation fol-
lowed. As one gay Oregon man explains, "the words lesbian and
gay are on people's lips and in their thoughts more than they
ever have been before .... But as visibility is raised, so is the
intensity, and the number of assaults and harassing incidents is
clearly up."23 Despite gains in awareness of sexual orientation
discrimination issues, anti-gay violence still remains a significant
social problem for American society.
A. Statistical Evidence
Bias against gay men and lesbians led to Paul Steckman's
killing. Sadly, these bias crimes are being committed in commu-
nities throughout the United States. Paul Steckman's story is not
an anomaly: anecdotal evidence and statistical records prove that
gay men and lesbians are frequently targets of sexual orientation
bias crimes.24
Recent studies provide statistical evidence of the nationwide
frequency of bias crimes based on actual or perceived sexual ori-
entation.25 More and more lesbians and gay men are attacked
22. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30b (West 1994). Though this constitutional
amendment was approved by voter initiative on Nov. 3, 1992, the Colorado
Supreme Court has upheld a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the
initiative. Evans v. Romer, nos. 945A48, 945A128, 1994 WL 554621 (Colo. Oct.
11, 1994).
23. John Woestendiek, For Gay Americans, New Visibility and New Wony,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 22, 1992, at CI (quoting Robert Ralph).
24. See generally Federal Bureau of Investigations, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Hate Crime Statistics, 1990 (1991) (reporting 425 anti-gay attacks out of the
total of 4755 reported hate crimes in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New York and Oregon); NATIONAL GAY AND LESmAN TASK FORCE
POLICY INsTrtrrE, ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VIOLENCE, VICTIMIZATION & DEFAMATION
IN 1991 19-20 (1992), [hereinafter ANTI-GAY/LEsBIAN VIOLENCEl
25. This Article will not distinguish between the types of bias crimes that
are committed against gay men and lesbians. Recent studies that track general
characteristics of bias crimes against gays bring out shared characteristics that
emphasize the seriousness of this problem. Professor Anthony Winer analyzed
the patterns found in these bias crimes and discovered "identifiable and distinct
patterns of criminal behavior in such perpetrators." See Winer, supra note 15, at
410-19. Winer found:
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every year simply for being gay: anti-gay/lesbian violence rose 31
percent between 1990 and 1991 in five major cities (Boston, Chi-
cago, Minneapolis/St. Paul, New York, and San Francisco).26
These five major cities alone account for 1,898 hate crimes
against gay men and lesbians in 1993.27
Criminal statistics are important in discussing bias crimes
against homosexuals, for they identify trends and help fashion
remedies. But the statistics themselves are problematic, as com-
mentators contend that crime statistics are notoriously unrelia-
ble.28 Gay activists, anti-gay rights groups and law enforcement
officials all argue that current official statistics on hate crimes do
not paint an accurate picture of the number of actual occur-
rences of hate crimes against gays. Statistics on crimes against
gays vary greatly among these three groups' records and are hotly
contested by opponents of homosexual rights and hate crime
legislation.
Variations abound between gay activists' statistics and local
law enforcement records. For example, 421 bias crimes against
gay men and lesbians were reported to gay rights groups in Min-
nesota in 1992,29 but only 30 incidents were recorded by Minne-
sota police.30 The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force
reported 1822 incidents in Boston, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Chi-
cago, New York and San Francisco; 1 police in those cities record
only 362 bias crimes.1
2
[C]haracteristics typical of hate crime against lesbians and gay men
[include]: gruesome and brutal execution of the crime, .. "seeking
out" behavior to intentionally locate and select the victim (s), [and] an
implicit moral or social justification for the violence .... Although not
all are present in all cases, and although there may be cases where
none are present, each is a broad characteristic of the phenomenon.
Id. at 419.
26. William B. Rubenstein, Introduction to LESBIANs, GAY MEN AND THE
LAw 1 (William B. Rubenstein ed. 1993).
27. Joseph P. Shapiro et al., Straight Talk About Gays, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., July 5, 1993, at 42.
28. SeeJacobs, supra note 20. Jacobs argues that the statistical increase
results from increased reporting rather than increasing amounts of crimes. He
states that "[t]he perception of a crime wave may owe as much to increasing
sensitivity as increasing violence. What appears to be a 'crime wave' may be
explained in part by a greater willingness to regard and report certain crimes as
bias-related, and by a better system for collecting and recording information
about these offenses." Id at 18.
29. Mark Brunswick, Gay Group Says Crimes are More Vicious, STAR TuB.,
Mar. 10, 1993, at 3B.
30. Ild.
31. ANTI-GAY/LESBAN VIOLENCE, supra note 24, at 1.
32. Id at 12.
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National statistics are not more consistent. Despite the pas-
sage of the Hate Crimes Statistics Act in 1990, problems still arise
in obtaining statistical accuracy. The Hate Crime Statistics Act
requires the F.B.I. to compile national statistics on hate crimes,
including crimes targeting victims based on their actual or per-
ceived sexual orientation. 3 The F.B.I., however, is the primary
collector of only federal crimes committed against gays, a limited
category; for state statistics, the F.B.I. relies on statistics provided
by local authorities, if the state or municipality even tracks this
information. 4
B. Problems with Reporting Bias Crimes
Criminal statistics vary because of the numerous problems
which arise when gay men and lesbians report bias crimes. If a
jurisdiction does not have a hate crime statute or does not
require data collection for hate crimes, no evidence about the
occurrence of hate crimes will be available from that jurisdiction.
Even when bias crime statutes and bias crime reporting acts exist,
the victim's status as a homosexual makes reporting these crimes
to authorities difficult for gay and lesbian victims.
Gay men and lesbians are more vulnerable as victims
because they have many disincentives to report crimes to authori-
ties. Reporting a crime under certain circumstances might unin-
tentionally "out" the victim. For example, if the, crime occurred
in an identifiable gay neighborhood or near a known gay club,
the resulting inferences could affect the victim's employment,
housing and personal relationships. While victims may want to
prosecute their assailants, they are too vulnerable as homosexu-
als in American society to be exposed in this manner.
35
Lack of statutory protection against sexual orientation dis-
crimination, therefore, stymies accurate reporting of bias crimes
committed against gays because these circumstances uninten-
tionally "out" the victim and make that "outing" public record.
33. 28 U.S.C.A. § 534 (West 1994).
34. These variances in statistics are problematic, but they cannot be
resolved within this Article's confines. This Article will focus not on the
statistical discrepancies themselves, but on the reasons why these differences in
bias crime data exist.
35. See generally KIRK & MADSEN, supra note 19, at 102-07; Marc A. Fajer,
Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and
Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. Miumi L REv. 511, 572-73
(1992); Susan Finch, New Orleans Panel Urges Gay-bashing Watch, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Feb. 4, 1994, at B3; Ellen Nakashima & Marisa Osorio Colon, In Effect Since
1990, State's Hate Crime Law Brings Few Convictions, HARTFORD CouRAT, July 19,
1993, at Al; Frank Trejo, Silence Hurts Efforts to Solve Crimes Against Gays, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 31, 1994, at 21A.
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Few state and local governments offer any protection from
employment and housing discrimination against gay men and
lesbians. The United States government had never banned dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation in any of its programs
until 1994.36 Sodomy laws criminalizing homosexual conduct
still exist in 24 states and the District of Columbia, 7 though vio-
lators are infrequently prosecuted.38 Therefore, when perpetra-
tors intentionally select a gay man or lesbian as their victim, they
know they are attacking a victim whose vulnerability may discour-
age reporting of a bias crime.
Because gay victims are not able to press charges of bias
crimes without exposing themselves to additional sexual orienta-
tion discrimination, many are unwilling to cooperate in prosecut-
ing these cases. For instance, in Los Angeles, eight men were
arrested for assaulting two men with baseball bats in an area fre-
quented by gay men and lesbians.3 9 Witnesses called police to
report the attack, and police referred to the incident as an appar-
ent "gay bashing."' Though all eight assailants were arrested
within minutes after the attack, the victims of the attack have not
been located. 41 Apparently the victims left the scene before the
police arrived. "Gay bashing" crimes involve gay victims, and for
36. Congress' earthquake assistance bill, signed in the wake of the
January 17, 1994, California earthquake, was the first federal law to add sexual
orientation to the list of groups protected against discrimination in distribution
of disaster relief. Kenneth J. Cooper, Hill Bans Gay Bias in Quake Aid, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 19, 1994, at Al.
37. Sexual Orientation, supra note 18 at 1517. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-
65(a)(3) (1994); Amiz REv. STAT. §§ 13-1411 to -1412 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 5-14-122 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1989 & Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT.
§ 800.02 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-
6605 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100
(Baldwin 1984); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MD. CODE ANN. art.
27, §§ 553-554 (1987); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 750.158, 750.338-.338(b) (West
1991); MIN. STAT. § 609.293 (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1994);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101, 45-5-
505 (1993); NEv. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993); N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-177 (1993) (effective only until Jan. 1, 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21
§ 886 (West Supp. 1995); R. i. GEN. LAws § 11-10-1 (1994); S. C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 1976); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§.21.01 (1), 21.06 (West
1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-361 (Michie
Supp. 1994). Of these statutes, seven states (Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, and Texas) only prohibit sodomy between persons
of the same gender. Sexual Orientation, supra note 18, at'1520 & n.5.
38. See LAURENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrurioNAL LAw, 1424-25 n.32
(2d ed. 1988).




318 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
some lesbians and gay men, that public label can have too many
repercussions.
C. Police Relations with the Gay Community
Another reason gay men and lesbians do not report bias
crimes committed against them to the police stems from percep-
tions about the relations between the police and the gay commu-
nity. Before and after the Stonewall riots of June 1969,42 gay
men and lesbians clashed with police nationwide over police
treatment of gay victims, gay criminals, and crimes against gays.
43
Individual episodes of police mistreatment of gay men and
lesbians" lead to wide distrust of police by the gay community.
With the continuing criminalization of sodomy in almost half of
the United States, that mistrust is well grounded. Remember
Michael Hardwick, whose arrest and trial triggered the Supreme
Court's review of state sodomy statutes in Bowers v. Hardwick;45
Hardwick's treatment by the police leaves little question why he
challenged the constitutional validity of Georgia's sodomy stat-
ute, as he was grievously mistreated while in custody. Despite the
presence of a bondsman when his arrest was processed, he was
held in custody, and his arresting officers taunted and abused
Hardwick while he was jailed.46
While putting him behind bars... the jail officers made it
clear to the other inmates that Hardwick was gay and had
been charged with sodomy, saying, "Wait until we put him
into the bullpen. Well, fags shouldn't mind - after all,
that's why they are here."
47
If these experiences are part of the common lore about the
police that exists in gay communities nationwide, it explains why
gay victims may hesitate to call police and might mistrust police
or refuse to follow through with their complaints.
Mistrust and misconceptions about the gay community and
the police lead to two problems. First, victims of sexual orienta-
42. On June 27, 1969, the New York Police Department attempted to
close down the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar in New York City's Greenwich Village.
These police actions caused the patrons to riot and set off a string of riots
throughout the following week. Many observers view the Stonewall Riots as the
start of popular gay political activism. See Introduction to Symposium, Stonewall at
25, 29 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 277, 277-78 (1993).
43. Fajer, supra note 36, at 572-73.
44. ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VIOLENCE, supra note 24, at 19-20 (describing seven
incidents of police abuse against gays).
45. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
46. See TRIBE, supra note 39, at 1424-25 n.32.
47. Id.
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tion bias crimes either do not report these crimes to police or
they conceal evidence of bias when making their reports. Gay
men and lesbians' past relations with police may contribute to
present problems with accurate reporting of bias crime statistics.
According to a 1989 study, 73 percent of victims of anti-gay vio-
lence did not report the incident to the police. Sixty-seven per-
cent of these "had experienced or perceived the police
themselves as homophobic. And 14 percent were afraid the
police would bash them."48 These findings seriously undermine
the accuracy of police departments' statistics on anti-gay bias
crimes.
Second, police may be disregarding evidence of bias crimes
when investigating incidents involving gay and lesbian victims.49
Some gay victims report that police miss evidence of bias when
investigating crimes. In Dallas, Russell Carter was attacked
because his assailant thought Carter was gay. Shouting anti-white
and - anti-gay slurs, the gunman attacked Carter and his two
friends as all three left a bar in the predominantly gay Oak Lawn
area and got into Carter's Jeep.5 ° One of Carter's friends was
shot when the three of them tried to escape from their attacker's
attempt to abduct them.51
This assault, however, was not originally listed as a bias
crime; police said that Carter and his friends "failed to mention
any bias against gays as a possible motive."5" Carter agreed that
he had not said anything about the anti-gay comments. "When
we made the report, we were still in such shock. The police
officer was talking to us 30 to 45 minutes after it happened.""5
So Carter did not immediately report the anti-gay comments.
Soon after the event occurred, however, Carter contacted police
to add the anti-gay slurs their assailant used.54
48. Fajer, supra note 36, at 572 (quoting Nat Hentoff, A Case of Loathing:
Gay Bashing is Out of the Closet. Again., PLAYBOY, May 1991, at 94, 96 (quoting
study reported in the J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE)).
49. Minkowitz, supra note 34, at 369. Minkowitz discusses the murder of
Julio Rivera, in which the two defendants went out to assault a gay man, "lured"
their victim, a gay bartender from the South Bronx, into a darkened corner,
then beat him to his death. During the murder investigation "it took [the]
police [N.Y.P.D.] nine months to classify the murder as a bias crime, and they
never assigned a full-time detective to the murder. They let valuable... leads
slip out of their hands because.., they were reluctant to give credence to the
statements of a gay prostitute who linked the three skinheads to the crime." Id.
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When police are not trained to look for bias when investigat-
ing crimes, they do not question victims about details that lead to
anti-gay bias crime charges. Even in predominantly gay areas,
where the assault on Carter and his friends occurred, police did
not ask if any link existed between the area, the victims, and the
attack. Follow-up investigations also miss these details. Unless
victims like Carter articulate evidence of bias, the bias crime is
missed, and the perpetrator is not charged with the bias crime.
Even when ample evidence of a bias crime exists, it is no
guarantee that police will conduct a hate crime investigation.
When Michael Jones and Dave Mericle returned to their Phoenix
home after work on the morning of September 16, 1994, they
found their house ransacked, flooded and vandalized.5" Spray
painted on the shower wall, in large red letters was the word
"FAG.""6 Above one bed, in red spray paint, read "HOMOS." 7
Other anti-gay slurs covered the walls in the hallway and family
room, where chairs were slashed, antique china ruined, and
holes punched into walls.5" Despite this destruction,59 Jones and
Mericle discovered the intruders only stole some beer.6°
Despite clear evidence of bias against this homosexual
couple, Phoenix police did not dispatch a hate crimes detective
until after eight hours had passed, and only after anti-violence
activists called to request one.61 A Phoenix police spokesman
admitted that communication within the department had bro-
ken down, stating that "[i]n this particular case there perhaps
should have been a quicker notification .... It's not supposed to
happen that way. But in this case it did."6" Unfortunately, many
gay men and lesbians believe that this is the case more often than
not when bias crimes against gays occur.63
These problems converge into telling statistics: for instance,
the Chicago-based Anti-Violence Project of Horizons Community
Services documented 204 incidents of hate crimes against Chi-
cago-area gays in 1993; the police received reports in only 34 of
55. Russ Hemphill, Angry Gay Couple Offers Tours of Vandalized Home,




59. Gay Couple's House Targeted by Vandals, ARiz. REPuB., Sept. 17, 1994, at
B2 (reporting that $25,000 in damage was done to Jones and Mericle's house).
60. Hemphill, supra note 56, at Al.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Minkowitz, supra note 34, at 368.
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these incidents to the police; and 29 of these incidents involved
police officers."
Reporting a crime as a bias crime is important. Accurate
reporting of bias crimes supports the significance of these crimes
to gay men and lesbians. More importantly, it focuses police
work on the acquisition of evidence related to the bias incident,
increasing the chances of a conviction for the bias crime. It also
publicizes the fact that crime against gay men and lesbians will
not be ignored by the criminal system.65
Police department remedies are limited in scale and scope
and fail to compensate for other deficits in the criminal justice
system for gay and lesbian victims. Without enhanced penalties
at sentencing for these bias crimes, measures such as better bias
crime identification and investigation training are effectively sti-
fled because criminal convictions for bias incidents receive the
same punishment as other violent assaults without any biased vic-
tim selection. Without penalty enhancement statutes, police
have no incentive to investigate bias evidence, because it is not
guaranteed to have any effect on the perpetrator's punishment.
D. Criminal "Justice" for Gay Victims
When bias crimes based on sexual orientation are reported
and police investigations confirm these charges, three specific
problems for gay victims arise within the criminal justice system.
First, prosecutors may decide not to charge a bias crime, because
these crimes require a high standard for prosecutors to prove the
biased intent of the defendant. Second,judges and juries can be
prejudiced against gay victims, which influences either the out-
come or the sentence in bias crime cases. Third, some courts
allow defendants in gay bashing cases to use "homosexual
advances" or "homosexual panic" defenses to excuse the defend-
ant's criminal liability for the attacks against gay victims and
undermine efforts to punish violence against gay men and
lesbians.
1. Charging Crimes as Bias Crimes
When gay and lesbian victims contact the police, and arrests
are made based on anti-gay, criminal acts, there is no guarantee
that the incident will be charged as a hate crime. Elizabeth
Najamy, a lesbian, had beer bottles thrown through her window
by Lance Abbott, a former neighbor, while he shouted "Dykes get
64. Tom Seibel, Hate Cimes Against Gays Dip 19% Here, CHI. SuN TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1994, at 12.
65. See Minkowitz, supra note 34, at 369.
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out!"" New Haven prosecutors did not charge Lance Abbott
with a hate crime. Under Connecticut law,6 7 making it a felony
to intimidate another out of bias and bigotry, this assault against
Najamy did not qualify as a hate crime, despite Abbott's com-
ments about her sexual orientation.' The prosecutor's office
stated that Najamy was not intimidated by Abbott's statement
because she and two friends threw trash at him and started down
the stairs from her apartment to confront him.69 The prosecu-
tors disregarded clear evidence of Abbott's intent to intimidate
by focusing instead on the victim's conduct.
Many crimes against gay men and lesbians are not charged
as bias crimes because of the concern about satisfying the burden
of proof. To convict someone under most hate crime statutes,
the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both the
elements of the underlying crime. and the intentional selection
of this victim by the defendant based on the victim's actual or
perceived sexual orientation. This is a difficult standard of
proof, as the defendant's abstract beliefs or past comments do
not fulfill this element.7 ° It is the defendant's intentional bias in
selecting this gay victim in this crime that must be found and
proved.71 These crimes require that the perpetrator's biased
intent be clearly manifested in the attack on the victim for the
bias crime to be charged. When a prosecutor must prove that a
defendant had biased intent in selecting a particular victim, it
might jeopardize a conviction for the underlying criminal
offense, because it draws attention away from the criminal ele-
ments of the underlying act.
2. Courtroom Prejudices Against Gay Victims
Because bias crime prosecutions indirectly focus attention
on the victim's status, prejudices against gay men and lesbians
are brought into the courtroom. These attitudes are then
exploited by defense attorneys to rationalize anti-gay violence.
7 2
Judge and jury prejudice against homosexual victims can
manifest itself in lighter sentences against their perpetrators.
66. Nakashima & Colon, supra note 36, at Al.
67. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181b (West Supp. 1994).
68. Nakashima & Colon, supra note 36, at Al.
69. Id.
70. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W. 2d 807, 822-25 (Bablitch,J. dissenting),
rev'd, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. CL 2194 (1993).
71. Id. at 825.
72. See Minkowitz, supra note 34, at 368; Nakashima & Colon, supra note
36 at Al; Judge is Censured Over Remark on Homosexuals, N. Y. TiMES, Nov. 28,
1989, at A28.
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This prejudice can be overt or implied; in either instance, if it
results in a lesser sentence or acquittal, there may not be enough
evidence to prove prejudicial error occurred at the trial level."
Unless the judge specifically expresses a prejudicial reason for
the lower sentence or gives an outrageously low sentence for a
bias crime, no obvious sexual orientation discrimination can be
proven. 7
If no overt prejudice is displayed by judge or jury, but the
victim's acts are given as one reason for a lighter sentence, it
sends a strong message to the gay community. That message
states that because of their status as homosexuals, they will be
perceived as wrongdoers themselves, and this perception may
influence the judge or jury's impressions of the events and the
ultimate disposition of the case. Even when considerations of the
victim's conduct are legitimate, the gay community perceives
these inquiries as anti-gay, and this undermines their belief in
the fairness of the criminal justice system.75
The criminal justice system can contribute to the problems
of accurate bias crimes reporting. Courtroom prejudices against
gay men and lesbians as victims discourages these victims from
prosecuting bias crimes even while other attempts are made to
encourage these victims to report and prosecute these crimes.
Victims have no incentive to prosecute bias crimes when they
73. Texas' State District Judge Jack Hampton sentenced a convicted
killer, Richard Lee Bednarski, to 30 years instead of life in prison for his
murder of two men in a Dallas park in May 1988. Hampton told a reporter that
he imposed the lesser sentence in part because the victims were two gay men
" 'cruising the streets picking up teen-age [sic] boys.' " Judge is Censured Over
Remark on Homosexuals, N. Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 1989, at A28. Though Hampton
was censured for his comments by the Texas State Commission on Judicial
Conduct, a fact-finding panel concluded that Hampton's biased statements had
not affected Hampton's judgment in the case.
74. See Stephen Hunt & Sheila R. McCann, Is Utah Judge Unjust or Just
Doing His Job? SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 21, 1994, at Al (discussing Utah. 3rd
District Judge David S. Young's lowering of murderer David Nelson Thacker's
sentence from the plea bargain's recommended 1 to 15 years to 6 years in the
murderous shooting of a gay man, Douglas Koehler).
75. See Bob Egelko, Activists Vow Appeal of 'Basher' Decision; No Legal
Malice, NAT'L L.J.; Sept. 11, 1989, at 16. The California State Court of Appeals
reduced the second degree murder convictions of three men to involuntary
manslaughter after finding that the state had not proven elements of malice
necessary to convict on the greater charge. Despite the legitimate basis for the
Court's action, the ire of local gay rights activists was raised because these men
had assaulted the victim, shouted anti-gay slurs, and knocked him to the ground
before driving off, laughing. The victim died as a result of the injuries he
received when he hit his head after being knocked down. Local gay rights
activists described the decision to reduce the charges "a homophobic opinion
[couched] in legal theory." Id.
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have little assurance that these charges will lead to accurate
sentences, while they risk "secondary victimization"76 as homo-
sexuals when their homosexual status becomes known.
3. Homosexual Advance Defenses
Homosexual advance defenses create a disincentive to
report anti-gay bias crimes because the gay community perceives
that the victim's homosexual status becomes the focus of the
defendant's defense. The victim's homosexuality may allow the
defendant to assert two particular defenses in bias murders.
First, some courts allow defendants to assert a "homosexual
panic" insanity defense.77 A second defense allows the "gay
advance defense " " as a type of self-defense or heat of passion
defense for these defendants.
When defendants are tried for the violent crimes they com-
mit against gays, they can raise these homosexual advance
defenses to mitigate their crimes. These defenses excuse the
assailants' acts as a panicked or passionate response to homosex-
ual advances, a "presumably... terrifying and disgusting event"79
that should lessen a "reasonable" defendant's culpability for the
offense.80
If either homosexual advance defense results in a lesser sen-
tence, gay men and lesbians sense courts' unwillingness to pro-
tect homosexuals to the same extent as heterosexuals are
protected. When courts allow this defense, and validate it with
acquittals, the impact is far reaching. Recognizing homosexual
panic as a mental disease or defect diminishes individual respon-
sibility for the consequences of bias prejudice, and accepts such
76. Winer, supra note 16, at 413-15.
77. This defense asserts that the defendant has latent homosexual
feelings which have remained severely repressed. When the victim made a
nonviolent homosexual pass at this defendant, the defendant had a psychotic
reaction which caused the defendant to lose the ability to tell right from wrong.
The defendant then became panicked and responded violently, killing the
victim in this insane rage. Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The
Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation. 80 Cal. L. Rev. 133, 135 (1992)
(citing Robert G. Bagnall et al., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in
the Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497, 499 (1984)).
78. Id. at 135. This defense allows the defendant to argue that, when
faced with a nonviolent homosexual pass, a reasonable person could find this to
be reasonable provocation for the defendant to react violently. If the finder of
fact makes this finding, it reduces a murder charge to voluntary manslaughter.
79. KiRx AND MADSEN, supra note 19, at 58.
80. Id.
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behavior as unchangeable and unavoidable, thereby encouraging
its reoccurrence.8 '
Juries need to hear about the defendant's perceptions,
because these are crucial to establishing the defendant's intent.
But these defenses propose that the defendant's irrational bias
against gays excuses the defendant's violent reaction. These
defenses allow, even reward, homophobic violence because
hatred of homosexuals becomes a reasonable excuse for commit-
ting a violent crime against gay men and lesbians.
The continued use and acceptance of this defense sends
[the] message to juries and the public that if someone
makes a homosexual overture, such an advance may be suf-
ficient provocation to kill that person. This reinforces
both the notions that gay men are to be afforded less
respect than heterosexual men, and that revulsion and
hostility are natural reactions to homosexual behavior.S
2
Instead of focusing on the defendant's criminal act, judges
and juries evaluate the nature of the victim's conduct, and a con-
viction may rest on their perceptions about homosexuals and
homosexuality.
If the defendant [in a murder case] can persuade the trier
of fact that the victim's conduct was sufficiently egregious
to inflame the passions of a reasonable man, then the
defendant is guilty only of manslaughter. When that
behavior is alleged to be homosexual in character, prevail-
ing cultural climate more than normative .and objective
elements on which manslaughter theory is dependent
affects the ultimate verdict.
8 3
Criminal justice goals of deterrence and retribution are
thwarted. These defenses use the defendant's bias to excuse the
defendant's crimes, so they do not deter a person from selecting
their victim based on bias. Society does not receive adequate ret-
ribution for these crimes because the real problem of the
defendant's bias is disregarded.
These flaws in the criminal justice system help explain the
statistical variances in bias crimes and highlight the particular
problems involved with reporting and prosecuting crimes against
gay men and lesbians. The criminal justice system cannot
counteract the individual and social consequences of bias crimes
through traditional criminal statutes and sentencing.
81. Sexual Orientation, supra note 18, at 1544.
82. Mison, supra note 78, at 136.
83. I&
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Because bias crimes based on sexual orientation have a
direct, destructive impact on gay men and lesbians individually
and collectively, effective prosecution and punishment of these
crimes demands priority in our legislatures and courts. Because
numerous problems exist in reporting and prosecuting bias
crimes involving sexual orientation, special emphasis on protec-
tion of gay victims is needed. Bias crimes, therefore, deserve spe-
cial attention from courts and legislatures, as well as from society
at large.
II. WIscoNsIN V. AiTciEWL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
FOR BIAS CRIMEs
If a defendant is convicted of a crime involving bias in victim
selection, but is only punished for the underlying criminal
offense, the crime has not been adequately punished. Since
Blackstone's times, courts and legislatures have realized that "it is
but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those
should be most severely punished, which are the most destructive
of the public safety and happiness." 4 Today, some legislatures
realize that bias crimes fit this category because bias crimes vic-
timize social classes and have divisive effects. 5 As traditional
criminal sentencing does not effectively punish bias crimes, legis-
latures have responded to this problems by expressly requiring
enhanced penalties at sentencing for crimes involving bias. Leg-
islatures have passed statutes enhancing sentences for felonies
and misdemeanors if evidence of the defendant's bias against the
victim's race, ethnicity, religion, gender or sexual orientation can
be proven at trial to have led to the defendant's victim
selection.
8 6
84. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993) (quoting 4
WuLtAm BLAxsroNE, COMMENTARIES *16).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 15-22.
86. "At the state level, the response to reports of bias related crime has
been significant. Nearly every state in the country has enactedsome form of
hate crime legislation." Constitutional Defense, supra note 17, at 1315. See CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 422.6, 422.7, 422.75 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994), § 1170.75 (West
1985 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-181b (West Supp. 1994);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4003 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West
1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, sec. 5/12-7.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 730, § 5/5-5-3.2(10) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 729A.2 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.595, Subds. la, 2(b); § 609.2231,
Subd. 4 (West Supp. 1994); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.185 (Michie Supp.
1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6 5 1:6 (g) (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:12-1c, :33-
4d, :44-3e, :43-7a(5) (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.155, .165 (1990);
R-I. GEN. LAws § 11-5-13 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (Supp. 1994);
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The statutory provisions of most states give additional crimi-
nal penalties for crimes punishable under other penal code sec-
tions when these crimes are committed because of bias against
the victim.87 Under most of these crime codes "[p]enalties may
be enhanced either by reclassifying the underlying offense as a
more serious crime or by finding the defendant guilty of an addi-
tional offense of 'intimidation' or 'harassment.' "8
The Supreme Court recently addressed the constitutionality
of these bias crime sentencing enhancement statutes in Wisconsin
v. Mitchell 89 This case concerned a Wisconsin statute which
allows for penalty enhancement when evidence of biased selec-
tion of victims is present.9 °
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (West Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 939.645 (West Supp. 1993).
87. Constitutional Defense, supra note 17,.at 1315.
88. Id.
89. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
90. Wis. STA. §§ 939.645 (1989-90), quoted in Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2197
n.1, provided at the time of Mitchell's trial:
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the
underlying crime are increased as provided in sub. (2): .
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime
under par. (a) is committed or selects the property which is
damaged or otherwise affected by the crime under par. (a)
because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the
owner or occupant of that property.
(2) (a) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a
misdemeanor other than a Class A misdemeanor, the revised
maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum period of
imprisonment is one year in the county jail.
(b) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A
misdemeanor, the penalty increase under this section
changes the status of the crime to a felony and the revised
maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum period of
imprisonment is 2 years.
(c) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is a felony, the
maximum fine prescribed by law. for the crime may be
increased by not more than $5,000 and the maximum period
of imprisonment prescribed by law for the crime may be
increased by not more than 5 years.
(3) This section provides for enhancement of the penalties applicable
for the underlying crime. The court shall direct that the trier of
fact find a special verdict as to all of the issues specified in sub.
(1).
(4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry is
required for a conviction for that crime.
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Mitchell arose out of an incident occurring on October 7,
1989.9' A group of young black men, including the defendant
Todd Mitchell, were gathered at an apartment complex. The
group's conversation turned to a racially charged scene from the
movie "Mississippi Burning" in which a white man beats a black
boy who was praying.92 The group moved outside; a young white
boy walked by.9" Mitchell said, "[y]ou all want to flick somebody
up? There goes a white boy; go get him" as the boy walked past.94
Mitchell then counted to three and pointed in the boy's direc-
tion; the group ran after the boy, beat him severely, and stole his
tennis shoes.95 The boy spent four days in a coma.9
6
Mitchell was found guilty of aggravated assault, which in Wis-
consin carries a maximum sentence of two years.97 But because
the jury found that Mitchell had intentionally selected his victim
because of the boy's race, his sentence was enhanced to a maxi-
mum of seven years.98 Mitchell was sentenced to four years.9
Mitchell challenged the constitutionality of this statute on
First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, arguing
that the statute impermissibly infringed on his protected rights of
freedom of speech, due process and equal protection of the
laws. 00 Because his criminal conduct received more punishment
because he selected his victim because of the victim's race, Mitch-
ell argued that statutes enhancing penalties for conduct moti-
vated by a discriminatory point of view impermissibly punished
him for his beliefs. 10 ' His appeal was rejected by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals; the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed his
conviction, however, finding that the statute in question violated
Mitchell's First Amendment rights.102
In an unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court, declaring that these sen-
tencing enhancement provisions for bias crimes did not infringe
The statute was amended in 1992; those amendments were not at issue in the
Mitchell decision. Mitchegl 113 S. CL at 2197 n.1.
91. Mitche, 113 S. CL at 2196.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2196-97.
95. Id. at 2197.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (applying Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1)(b), supra note 91).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2197 n.2.
101. Id. at 2198.
102. Id. at 2197.
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on constitutionally protected speech. 0 3 The Court held that vio-
lent crime intended to express an idea is not expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment.'0 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion recognized that judges
have traditionally considered "a wide variety of factors in addi-
tion to evidence bearing on guilt in determining what sentence
to impose on a convicted defendant."10 5 Though a defendant's
"abstract beliefs" cannot be taken into account by the judge
when sentencing, " 'the Constitution does not erect a per se bar-
rier to the admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and
associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and
associations are protected by the First Amendment.' "106 Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that in criminal trials
[t]he First Amendment ... does not prohibit the eviden-
tiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or
to prove motive or intent. Evidence of a defendant's previ-
ous declarations or statements is commonly admitted in
criminal trials subject to evidentiary rules dealing with rele-
vancy, reliability, and the like.
10 7
Relying on precedents which allocate responsibility to set
criminal penalties to the state legislatures, 0 8 the Mitchell Court
found that Wisconsin's statute punished bias-inspired conduct
because its legislature found that "this conduct is thought to
inflict greater individual and societal harm... [as] bias-motivated
crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict dis-
tinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community
unrest."10 9 The Wisconsin Legislature's reasons provide "an ade-
quate explanation for its penalty-enhancement provision over
and above mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or
biases." 110 The Mitchell Court found that this statute, therefore,
expresses a legitimate state purpose for its enactment that does
not regulate speech and is aimed at conduct unprotected by the
First Amendment.1 '
103. Id. at 2197.
104. Id. at 2199. The Mitchell Court did not address Fourteenth
Amendment issues, as those claims had not been analyzed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.
105. Id. at 2198-99 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 2200 (quoting Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1094
(1992)).
107. Id. at 2201.
108. Id. at 2200 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980); Gore
v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)).
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Opponents of: Mitchell objected that state punishment of
biased intent punishes both speech and expression protected by
the First Amendment.1 2 Because Mitchell's conviction "appears
to have resulted solely from his speech,"11 the only- evidence
available in this case to establish the bias crime was his speech. 1 4
When states punish criminal conduct motivated -by bias, these
opponents argue, these laws punish defendants for their
speech. 1 5 Under Mitchell, therefore, the state's right to punish
crimes trumps the defendant's right to express unpopular ideas
protected by the First Amendment.
The Mitchell court, however, did not find that the Wisconsin
statute regulated speech, deciding that this statute was a constitu-
tionally permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct. 1 6
Justice Rehnquist also dismissed the claim that these regulations
might restrict free speech as "speculative." The Mitchell Court
refused to accept as plausible a hypothesis that suggests "a citizen
[would be] suppressing his bigoted beliefs for fear that evidence
of such beliefs will be introduced against him at trial if he com-
mits a... serious offense against person or property."' 17 These
bias crime provisions are not constitutionally overbroad and
therefore have no "chilling effect" on protected speech. 1 8
A second objection to the Mitchell decision is that it infringes
on protected expressive conduct." 9 Opponents argued that
Mitchell's conduct fulfilled the Court's requirements to be con-
sidered expressive conduct under the First Amendment.' Fur-
thermore, because Mitchell's conduct meets the definition of
expressive conduct, the Wisconsin statute must then pass the test
for permissible regulation of expressive conduct as set out in
United States v. O'Brien.
121
Although the Mitchell court did not hold that the Wisconsin
statute regulated expression and so did not analyze it under First
112. Brooks, supra note 12, at 723.
113. Id. at 724 (arguing that Mitchell's conviction may have resulted onlly
from his encouragement to the others to commit the crime, though Mitchell
may not have participated in the beating, as he maintained).
114. Id. at 725.
115. Id. at 725.
116. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200 (analogiiing the role of motive in the
Wisconsin statue to federal and state anti-discrimination laws as "permissible
content-neutral regulation of conduct." Id.).
117. Id. at 2201.
118. Id. at 2194.
119. Brooks, supra note 12, at 729.
120. Id. at 729-30 (arguing that Mitchell's acts met the requirements for
expressive conduct as set in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)).
121. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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Amendment jurisprudence, it is worthwhile to examine this stat-
ute under that light to answer Mitchell's critics. Accepting argu-
endo that Mitchell's conduct meets the requirements to be
considered expressive conduct, a review of the Wisconsin statute
under the Court's speech/conduct regulation test in O'Brien 2
shows that the statute would survive constitutional scrutiny even
if it were held to involve expression.
Under the analysis set out in O'Brien, four prongs must be
satisfied to justify statutes which regulate expression and which
incidentally interfere with First Amendment rights. 2 The Court
stated:
"[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. "124
Using the reasons expressed in the Mitchell court's opinion,
this statute fulfills all four prongs of this analysis, and is therefore
justified. The first prong is satisfied by the Wisconsin legisla-
ture's constitutional right to enact this type of statute. States
have always had the right to legislate matters concerning public
safety; the Tenth Amendment allows the Wisconsin Legislature
to enact criminal laws regulating conduct and sentencing
procedures. 
1 2 5
The second and third prongs of the O'rien test are also sat-
isfied by the Wisconsin statute. As Justice Rehnquist stated in his
opinion, the Legislature found that "bias-motivated crimes are
more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emo-
tional crimes on their victims, and incite community unrest."
1 26
The Wisconsin legislators' concerns about the social conse-
quences of bias crime relate to the government's substantial
interest in promoting the general peace; it is unrelated to the
suppression of free speech.
1 2 7
O'Brien's fourth prong requires that "the incidental restric-
tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
122. Id.
123. Id. at 376.
124. Id. at 377.
125. U.S. CONSr. amend X.
126. Mitchei4 113 S. Ct. at 2201.
127. Id. at 2200.
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essential to the furtherance of that [state] interest."128 Because
the Wisconsin statute requires a high standard of proof for a con-
viction under this statute, it severely limits any incidental
infringement on the defendant's First Amendment rights. To
convict a defendant under this statute, not only must the prose-
cutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant com-
mitted the crime, she must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant acted because of a biased motive directly
related to the underlying criminal act. The requirement that the
trier of fact find, by way of a special verdict, that the defendant
acted with this bias for a conviction under this statute fully satis-
fies the requirements of the fourth prong of the O'Brien test."
Because all four prongs of the O'Bien test are satisfied, even if
the Mitchell court had found that this statute did incorporate
speech and non-speech elements, the statute wouldnot infringe
upon protected speech under O'Brien's four-prong test, and so
would be upheld as constitutionally valid.13°
The Mitchell court explicitly concluded that its ruling on
hate crimes in Mitchell"3 l did not contradict its decision regard-
ing hate speech laws in RA. V. v. St. Paul...2 As the court dis-
cussed in Mitchell, the' Wisconsin statute only reached the
defendant's conduct, while the St. Paul, Minnesota municipal
ordinance at issue in R.A.V. expressly prohibited certain speech
by restricting "the use of 'fighting words' that insult or provoke
violence, 'on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gen-
der.' "13 In RA. V., a juvenile was convicted of violating a city
ordinance against hate speech when he was found guilty of light-
ing a cross in a black family's yard. The RA. V court held that
the ordinance violated the First Amendment, as biased speech or
expressive conduct directed at the groups protected by the stat-
ute could not be made a criminal offense unprotected by the
First Amendment.3 4
In Mitchell, Justice Rehnquist distinguished hate speech stat-
utes, such as that in RA. V v. St. Paul,"5 from hate crime statutes,
like Wisconsin's, which are constitutionally permissible because
128. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
129. Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (3) (1989-90); see supra note 91.
130. One commentator argues that hate crime statutes may even
encourage speech, because they deter "the alternative of physical abuse."
Penalty Enhancement, supra note 13, at 242 (footnote omitted).
131. Id at 2195.
132. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
133. Mitchel4 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
134. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2538.
135. R.A.V., 113 S. Ct. at 2538.
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they regulate conduct outside the reach of the First Amendment.
"[W]hereas the ordinance struck down in RA.V. was explicitly
directed at expression . . . the statute in this case is aimed at
conduct unprotected by the First Amendment."" 6 The First
Amendment protects free speech. When protected speech
becomes conduct, however, the state is allowed to step in and
regulate that conduct.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Mitchell gives constitutional
approval to statutes that enhance penalties at sentencing for bias
crimes. This decision, therefore, supports using bias crime stat-
utes similar to Wisconsin's law to address growing societal con-
cern over bias crimes against gay men and lesbians.
III. EXTENDING SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT PENALTIES TO
CRIMES AGAINST GAY MEN AND LESBIANS
Paul Steckman was brutally killed in a nation where homo-
sexual status alone serves as a basis for discriminatory violence.
This climate fosters attitudes like those of Smithton residents
who understood that teenagers might consider beating up a gay
man something that "might be cool."'" 7 This climate perpetu-
ates anti-gay violence because its perpetrators recognize that gay
men and lesbians are especially vulnerable victims lacking legal
protection against discrimination. This climate does little to
deter this violence because bias crimes against gays are not pun-
ished for their bias elements. Bias crimes against gay men and
lesbians, therefore, continue to be a significant social problem.
Out of the forty-one states with bias crime statutes,' only
fourteen states and the District of Columbia' specifically
include sexual orientation as a protected class. Indiana's legisla-
ture dropped "sexual orientation" from its proposed hate crimes
bill, as a Senate committee determined removing that "sexual
orientation" as a protected class would encourage support for the
measure in the Indiana Senate.' 4 0 Seven states describe the
classes protected under their bias statutes only in general
terms.' 4 ' Texas' hate crime statue adopted deliberately vague
language, not naming any one group or classification, because
disputes over inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected cate-
136. Id. at 2201.
137. Lewin, supra note 1, at A8.
138. See supra notes 9-10.
139. See supra note 87.
140. Gay Protection Dropped from Hate-Crimes Bill, CHi. TmiB., Feb. 22, 1994,"
at 3.
141. See supra note 10. •
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gory almost doomed the statute's passage.142 Repeated efforts to
pass hate crimes laws in Arizona 143 and New York1 44 failed
because opponents mobilized support against these bills because
of the inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected category.
Sexual orientation must be explicitly included as a protected
category in current and proposed bias crime legislation. 45
Extending bias crime statutes that enhance penalties at sentenc-
ing to include specifically those crimes committed because of the
defendant's bias against the victim's sexual orientation is a first
step toward eradicating violence against gay men and lesbians.
Assigning criminal liability to a defendant's intentional victimiza-
tion offers gay men and lesbians protection against anti-gay
violence.
A. Punishment of Both Crime and Bias
Without the statutory protection of enhanced penalties, anti-
gay crimes are not effectively punished and bias violence against
homosexuals is not effectively deterred. When intolerance of
homosexuality turns into violence against gay men and lesbians,
it is difficult to separate the defendant's biased intent from the
actual acts: these crimes occur because of hatred against gays.
Without bias crimes laws, however, our criminal system punishes
only the actual acts or attempts and the defendant's intent to
commit the act. Traditional criminal statutes cannot reach the
defendant's bias in selecting a victim, as laws focus on the
142. Sam Howe Verhovek, With Four Gay Men Slain, Texas Revisits Issue of
Hate Crime, N. Y. T MES, Aug. 30, 1994, at A15. Utah's hate crime statute also
eliminated all references to any protected groups, which resulted in a "law...
so weak, no prosecutor has ever attempted to use it." Paul Rolly, The Rolly
Report, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 21, 1994, at A2. Utah State Rep. Frank Pignanelli,
who wrote the original hate crimes bill to include specific protected classes, will
introduce another bill with these classes in the 1995 session, but has been told
he would need to eliminate the reference to sexual orientation to pass the bill.
Id. See supra note 10 (listing states that give broad descriptions of protected
classes under their hate crime statutes).
143. Dennis Wagner, Romley Aiming at Hate Crimes, PHOENIX GAzErrE,
Aug. 10, 1994, at B1.
144. Roni Rabin, Sex-Bias Violence Lawsuit?, NEWSDAY, Aug. 4, 1994, at A4.
145. In making this argument, it should be emphasized that these statutes
do not offer any "special rights" to the victims in these classes. These statutes
address two goals: first, punishing and deterring bias crimes against gays
because of their divisive social effect; second, offering gay men and lesbians
protection from violence. They do not give the homosexual victim any special
standing in the criminal justice system, nor are they meant to act as a validation
of homosexual conduct.
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defendant's motive to act, not the defendant's bias.' 4 6 By not
reaching the defendant's biased intent, states permit defendants
to act out their intolerance of homosexuality through violence.
Criminal codes that do not address perpetrators' intentional,
biased victim selection fail to recognize the psychic harm these
victims suffer. The defendants are not penalized for contribut-
ing to the widespread social harms related to bias crimes'4 7 and
the continuing victimization of homosexuals as a class.
14 8
The result of the failure to punish bias crime perpetrators in
proportion to the harm they cause is that continued violence
against gay men and lesbians is not deterred. The defendant's
bias is not challenged when the crime is prosecuted and pun-
ished, which means that the criminal justice system does not
effectively deter or rehabilitate the defendant. The victim, the
victim's class, and the community do not receive adequate retri-
bution for these crimes because punishment solely for the crime
itself does not force the defendant to recognize that bias-related
crime is harmful to society and will not be tolerated by the
community.
Though the state does not directly encourage hate crimes
against gays, it fails to discourage these crimes when they occur if
it does not punish the defendant for that bias. Punishing hate
crimes based on sexual orientation educates both the defendant
and our society, as it personalizes the costs of bias crimes to the
defendant who commits these crimes. Undergoing additional
punishment for crimes indicating biased intent clearly demon-
strates to a defendant that society will not tolerate bias violence
against gay men and lesbians.
B' The Role of Punishing Bias Crimes in Educating Society
About Anti-Gay Discrimination
Enhancing penalties at sentencing for bias crimes against
gays serves proactive and educational goals, as they not only
reach the individual defendants but society as well. Prosecution
of anti-gay bias crimes, combined with publicity of anti-gay bias
crimes, displays society's disapproval of anti-gay violence. Requir-
ing communities to punish bias crimes against homosexuals is
one way to eradicate social biases that view gay men and lesbians
as unprotected, expendable victims. Educating the community
about the evil of intolerance deters crimes against gay men and
146. See WALTER LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. Scoi-r, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 216-25
(2d. ed. 1986).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 15-23.
148. Thomas, supra note 23, at 1464.
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lesbians. Bias crime statutes that do not include sexual orienta-
tion as a protected category miss the opportunity to eradicate the
significant social problem of bias against gays.
Bias crimes statutes also function as an educational tool for
the state to counter discrimination. As one commentator says:
Message sending['s] ... goal is to express the abhorrence
of certain bigotries in the strong and unambiguous lan-
guage of the criminal law. This educative use of criminal
law is familiar in American jurisprudence, and it has a legit-
imate role to play in our legal system.
149
Legislatures and courts have traditionally used law to edu-
cate American society. One example of using law to address bias
involves statutes restricting racial discrimination. Implementing
civil rights protections forced Americans to address their racial
biases. Though these laws have not eradicated racism, they have
demonstrated the intolerane of the American public toward
racism in employment, education and housing. Statutes that
expressly protect gay men and lesbians from bias violence simi-
larily reflect a judgment of society that bias based on sexual ori-
entation is a disturbing, destructive and anti-social phenomenon
that will be specifically punished should it result in violent crime.
These proactive and educative goals are important in order
to eradicate bias crimes against gay men and lesbians. Psycholo-
gists' studies show that homophobia and related disordered psy-
chological conditions do not go far enough to explain why gay
bashing occurs. 5 ° "It's very functional to be prejudiced," says
psychologist Gregory Herek. "It's reinforced by friends, by
churches, and by society. They don't get any contradictory
messages from the media saying its [sic] bad to gay-bash." 5 ' Bias
crimes statutes are necessary to educate against crimes based on
the defendant's bias towards gay men and lesbians because other
sources do not consistently reject these acts. States can also effec-
tively rebut any claims that they tolerate gay bashing by enacting
and prosecuting these bias crimes.
C. Equal Protection from Violence for Gay Men and Lesbians
Bias crime statutes should also expressly protect gay men
and lesbians against violence, because including sexual orienta-
tion in these laws preserves the fundamental rights of homosexu-
149. Jacobs, supra note 22.
150. PHILIP M. KAVAL, BEARING WITNESS: GAY MEN'S HEALTH CRISIS AND
THE PoLrlcs OF AIDS 81 (1993) (citing John Voelcker, The Second Epidemic,
OUTrWEEK, July 11, 1990, at 48, 49).
151. Id.
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als to protection of person and property as guaranteed in the
Constitution. Under the Fourteenth Amendment,15 2 laws are
required to "treat all persons equally and fairly, and not invidi-
ously or arbitrarily,"153 in matters involving these fundamental
rights. Primary among these rights is the freedom from violence
perpetrated by private individuals. Criminal laws that fail to pro-
tect gay men and lesbians from violence violate this standard.
Homosexuals receive a lowered standard of protection of person
and property under these general laws because the laws do not
fully protect gay men and lesbians from anti-gay violence when
that bias goes unpunished by traditional criminal sentencing.
Sentencing penalty enhancement statutes for anti-gay crimes
secure the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment for gay
men and lesbians. "These statutes afford lesbians and gay men
the same civil rights to which all other groups are entitled: the
right to live, love and work free from violence. 1 54 These rights
are rights of citizenship denied to gay men and lesbians because
the states fail to discourage violence against them because of
their homosexual status. Explicitly addressing violence against
gays does not give gays any special rights, because "when victims
of irrational discrimination demonstrate that protection is war-
ranted, they do not receive 'special rights.' Rather, they merely
take on the same burden-free status as the majority." 155 Because
protection against sexual orientation violence is warranted from
the evidence of these bias crimes, granting that protection
through these statutes preserves the fundamental rights of gays
under the Constitution.
Despite these arguments favoring specifying sexual orienta-
tion as a protected class, including sexual orientation as a pro-
tected category under bias crime statutes has proven elusive.
Classifying by sexual orientation remains controversial, even
when these statutes only emphasize basic protections and do not
offer new rights, because homosexuality is not recognized as a
basis for legal protections. The next three sections address some
common arguments against specifically including sexual orienta-
tion as a protected category.
152. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
153. John C. Hayes, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality:
Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny after Bowers v. Hardwick, 31
B.C. L. REv. 375, 376 (1990).
154. Thomas, supra note 21, at 1907.
155. Id. at 1907 n.19.
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D. Sexual Orientation Versus Sexual Conduct: The Bowers Problem
Legislatures' attempts to protect gay men and lesbians by
extending bias crime statutes to punish sexual orientation bias
crimes are often countered by arguments declaring that "accord-
ing special protection to a class whose defining characteristic,
homosexual conduct, can be made illegal"' 56 makes these efforts
illogical. These ideas draw from the Supreme Court's 1986 deci-
sion in Bowers v. Hardwick,'57 which-denied gay men and lesbians
their right to sexual privacy, allowing states to regulate same sex
sodomy.
Bowers involved Michael Hardwick's challenge of the consti-
tutionality of Georgia's sodomy law.' Speaking for the majority
of the Court, Justice White refused to extend the right of privacy
to acts of consenting adult homosexuals, stating that "none of
the rights announced in those [privacy] cases bears any resem-
blance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy."159 Georgia therefore had the right to
regulate and criminalize homosexual sodomy.
Opponents of extending bias crime statutes to include sex-
ual orientation argue that Bowers should be read to deny legal
protection to homosexuals as a class. This argument fundamen-
tally misunderstands the purpose and impact of bias crime stat-
utes. The focus of bias crime statutes is to deter crimes against
gay men and lesbians, not to protect them from sodomy statues.
Bias crime statutes primarily focus on punishing, deterring, and
rehabilitating the bils-motivated criminal because of the detri-
mental effects of bias violence in society. These statutes do not
afford gay victims any additional legal rights; they merely enforce
the fundamental rights of gay men and lesbians to be free from
violence against person and property. Extending bias crimes
statutes to include sexual orientation does not address homosex-
ual conduct, and therefore does not interfere with states' right to
regulate that conduct.
E. Homosexual Status as an Illegitimate Basis for
Legal Discrimination
Bowers allows states to criminalize homosexual conduct, but
does not allow states to criminalize sexual orientation. No state
has the right to do so: the status of an individual cannot consti-
156. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 62-63 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom.
Steffan v. Perry 1994 WL 652249 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 1994).
157. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
158. Id. at 188.
159. Id. at 190-91.
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tute a criminal offense.' 6 Courts have also recently affirmed
that homosexual status alone cannot be the basis for discrimina-
tion even when homosexual conduct is actionable. Therefore,
because homosexual status is not illegal, it should not limit gay
men and lesbians' fundamental right to protection from
violence.
A recent decision involving a challenge to the United States
Department of Defense's policies on homosexuals in the military
emphasizes that homosexual status alone cannot justify discrimi-
nation against homosexuals. In Meinhold v. United States Depart-
ment of Defense,'6 ' the Ninth Circuit held that the Navy could not
discharge a serviceman for stating that he was gay. Petty Officer
Volker Keith Meinhold stated, "Yes, I am in fact gay," on ABC
World News Tonight's May 19, 1992 telecast. 62 The next day the
Navy instigated discharge proceedings; Meinhold was given an
honorable discharge on August 12, 1993. 63 Meinhold sued to
gain reinstatement, asking for a declaration that the Department
of Defense's policy against homosexuals in the military at the
time of the trial was unconstitutional.' The District Court
granted Meinhold's motion for summary judgment, ordered his
reinstatement and permanently enjoined the Department of
Defense from discharging or denying enlistment based on sexual
orientation after finding that the Navy's policy violated the Equal
Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment by banning gays based
on status, not conduct.'6 5
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Meinhold's reinstate-
ment. It found that Meinhold's statement of his homosexual sta-
tus "manifests no concrete, expressed desire to commit
homosexual acts."' 6 6 The Court did not affirm, however, the Dis-
trict Court's holding that the Directives did not pass "constitu-
tional muster."1 67  Judge Rymer deferred to the Navy's
professional judgment and accepted that "[t]he presence in the
military environment of persons who engage in homosexual con-
duct or who, by their statements, demonstrate a propensity to
engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accom-
160. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
161. 34 F.3d 1469 (1994).
162. Id. at 1472.
163. Id. at 1473.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1472.
166. Id. at 1479.
167. Id. at 1479.
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plishment of the military mission." 168 But in finding the mili-
tary's regulation of homosexual conduct constitutionally
acceptable, Judge Rymer also emphasized that "[n] othing in the
policy states that the presence of persons who say they are gay
impairs the military mission." 69
Therefore the Directives can be construed to avoid Equal
Protection questions by reading the regulations to "mandate sep-
aration due to a statement of homosexuality only when that state-
ment itself indicates more than the inchoate 'desire' or
'propensity' that inheres in status."170 The Department of
Defense's Directives, therefore, "reach a statement of homosexu-
ality only when the statement itself manifests a concrete,
expressed desire or intent to engage in homosexual acts."
1 71
Because the Court found that Meinhold's statements did not
implicate this desire or intent, they ruled that the Navy based
Meinhold's separation solely on his classification as a homosex-
ual.1 72 Therefore, Meinhold's dismissal on this basis cannot be
upheld.
173
This case emphasizes that homosexual status must be consid-
ered separately from homosexual conduct. The Meinhold court
granted great deference to the military's policies against homo-
sexual conduct; despite that deference, the Court did not allow
the military's concern about homosexual conduct to permit dis-
crimination against homosexuals who acknowledge this status.
Arguments against homosexual conduct may be legitimate; dis-
charge because of homosexual status alone raises concerns.
Meinhold recognizes that homosexual orientation, not homo-
sexual conduct, is an illegitimate basis for discrimination in the
military. This supports the logical separation between status and
conduct; opposition to including sexual orientation as a pro-
tected category because of homosexual conduct disregards this
separation. This conclusion respects the rights of many who
deplore homosexual conduct, while not allowing state actors to
168. Id. at 1477 (quoting Department of Defense Directive
1332.14(H) (1) (a)).
169. Id. at 1479.
170. Id. at 1479. But cf. Steffan v. Perry, 1994 WL 652249 at 5 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 22, 1994) (declaring that "the military may reasonably assume that when a
member states that he is a homosexual, that member means that he either
engages or is likely to engage in homosexual conduct.").
171. Id. at 1472.
172. Id. at 1479.
173. Id. at 1479-80. The Clinton Administration has decided not to
challenge the 9th Circuit's decision, because it was decided under military
regulations that have since been rewritten. Stephen Labaton, Vi-toy for Gay
Sailor Leaves Issue Unresolved, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 4, 1994, at E2.
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discriminate on the sole basis of homosexual orientation.
Extending bias crimes statutes to include sexual orientation,
therefore, does not interfere with states' right to regulate homo-
sexual conduct.
F. Recognition of Differences Between Homosexual Status and
Homosexual Conduct by Major Religions
Bias crime regulations face opposition from religious and
political groups that share a common belief that homosexual
conduct is immoral. Many American religious groups voice
objections to giving gay men and lesbians any form of legal rec-
ognition, including the protection of enhanced penalties for bias
crimes based on sexual orientation, because of their beliefs con-
cerning homosexuality.
Most major American denominations, including the Roman
Catholic Church, liberal Protestants, conservative Evangelicals,
and both Conservative and Orthodox Jews do not approve of
homosexual conduct. 74 Religious groups' opposition to homo-
sexual conduct extends to opposition to state action that affirms
the "gay lifestyle" as an acceptable, alternative lifestyle to the het-
erosexual norm. These groups might construe bias crime protec-
tions as state approbation of the "gay lifestyle," which they
consider to be inherently opposed to the "traditional" family val-
ues they espouse.
The official position of the Roman Catholic Church makes a
sharp distinction between one's sexual orientation, which by
itself is not morally wrong, and one's sexual conduct, which the
Church teaches should be confined to vaginal, non-contracepted
intercourse in a heterosexual marriage. Despite this criticism of
homosexual conduct, the Roman Catholic Church does not tol-
erate violence against gays:
[I]t is deplorable that homosexual persons have been and
are the object of violent malice in speech or in action.
Such treatment deserves condemnation from the church's
pastors wherever it occurs. It reveals a kind of disregard
for others which endangers the most fundamental princi-
ples of a healthy society. The intrinsic dignity of each per-
son must always be respected in word, in action and in
law.175
174. J. Gordon Melton, The Churches'Ethical Dilemma with Homosexuality, in
THE CHURCHES SPEAK ON: HoMoSExuALIY xxvi (1991) [hereinafter CHURCHES].
175. Doctrinal Congregation's Letter to Bishops: The Pastoral Care of Homosexual
Persons, 16 OUGINS 377, 380-81 (1986).
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Not one of these major American religious traditions con-
dones violence against homosexuals because of their sexual ori-
entation, regardless of whether or not they accept homosexual
conduct. Both Roman Catholics and liberal Protestants describe
homosexual orientation by itself to be a "morally neutral condi-
tion"; this stance encourages church religious leaders and mem-
bers to work to eradicate prejudice against homosexuals because
of their status.
176
Other religious denominations also condemn violence
against gay men and lesbians. In 1988, the Episcopal Church
approved a resolution on violence against homosexuals that
"decries the increase of violence against homosexual persons and
calls upon law enforcement officials . . . to be sensitive to this
peril and to persecute the perpetrators of these acts to the fullest
extent of the law."177 The Church encouraged all Bishops to
"speak openly and publicly to repudiate the misconception that
the Church encourages such violence.117  In 1983, the United
Church of Christ called for its members to support." [legislative
change that insures the elimination of violent acts perpetuated
because of... sexual orientation."179 The Presbyterian Church
in the United States has held that "there is no legal, social, or
moral justification for denying homosexual persons access to the
basic requirements of human social existence."' °
These religious traditions, though they do not approve of
homosexual conduct, affirm that homosexual status is not a
rationale for violence against gay men and lesbians. Because bias
crimes statutes focus on homosexual status rather than conduct,
they do not contradict the churches' views on this issue. In fact,
by enacting anti-gay bias crime measures, states act in accordance
with these religious teachings by working against violence based
on sexual orientation. Therefore, these anti-gay bias crime stat-
ues affirm the major religious denominations' position on homo-
sexual orientation and should not be opposed on the basis of
claims that these statutes contradict religious teachings.
176. CHURCHES, supra note 174, at xxvii.
177. Resolution on Violence Against Homosexuals, Episcopal Church (1988),
reprinted in CHURCHES, supra note 174, at 103-104.
178. Id.
179. Report of the Task Force for the Study of Human Sexuality, United Church of
Christ (1983), reprinted in CHURCHES, supra note 174, at 231.
180. Statement on the Ordination of Homosexuals: Policy Statement and
Recommendations, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (1978), reprinted in CHURCHES, supra
note 174, at 155.
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CONCLUSION
Bias crimes based on actual or perceived sexual orientation
require penalty enhancements at sentencing to give gay men and
lesbians equal protection from violence to their persons and
property. By its very definition, society guarantees all of its mem-
bers freedom from violence, and provides legal remedies for
others' infringements of these rights. When our government
fails to protect segments of society from bias-related crimes based
on sexual orientation by failing to deter these crimes through
effective punishment of discriminatory action, it fails in its essen-
tial mission.
Requiring bias crime statutes specifically to include 'sextial
orientation to enhance penalties for bias crimes is one solution
to this problem. Without this specific assignment of criminal lia-
bility, basic protections from violence of person and property are
not fully guaranteed to gay men and lesbians."" Because it is
"[t]he first duty of the Government to afford protection to its
citizens, " 1s2 states need to recognize that including sexual orien-
tation as a protected category is necessary to the protection of its
citizens. Not only do these penalty enhancement statutes punish
bias crimes against gays, they affirm the states' interest in elimi-
nating bias violence. Only through forceful promotion of this
interest can states ensure that their gay and lesbian citizens avoid
the fate of Paul Steckman.
181. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
182. Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DuKE L.J. 507, 508 (1992) (citing CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1867)(remarks of Rep. Farnsworth) (debating the
Reconstruction Act of 1867).
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